All as σκύβαλα beside the μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν: Philippians 3:7–11 in Dialogue with Epictetus

Abstract

In Philippians 3:8, Paul holds all things to be loss (ζημία) and even dung (σκύβαλον) in comparison with Christ. Similarly, beside a precise conception of the good (ἀγαθὸν), Epictetus considers earthly achievements and physical benefits as “indifferents” (ἀδιάφορα), which he defines as things that are neither good nor evil. This paper employs a comparative analysis of Paul and Epictetus to examine the tension inherent in both authors as they seek to explain the sufferings and enjoyments of human existence in light of humankind’s ultimate end. Despite Paul’s strong language, he still recognizes the value of temporal goods, including release from prison, recovery from illness, and financial assistance. Thus, a person can value these benefits when they are joined to the greatest good, as illustrated by Augustine’s conception of ordered loves. Like Paul, Epictetus affirms the lesser value of indifferents, particularly when they enable participation in the good. This paper argues that both Paul and Epictetus acknowledge a secondary value in things that are joined to the supreme good, but that Paul differs from Epictetus in classifying them as goods that can be rightly desired and in acknowledging temporary sufferings to be an evil even as they can bring about good.