Alienated, Independent and Female: Lessons from the Japanese Electorate

The development of digital technology has fundamentally changed political communication patterns, especially among Generation Z who grew up in a social media ecosystem. This study aims to analyze the influence of political campaigns through Instagram on changes in political attitudes of students at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Bina Bangsa University. This study uses an explanatory quantitative approach. Data collection techniques were carried out through a survey using a closed questionnaire, which was distributed to 100 respondents. Data were analyzed using a simple linear regression test with the help of SPSS software version 25. The results of the study indicate that political campaigns on Instagram have a significant influence on changes in students' political attitudes. The dimensions of attitudes influenced include attention to issues, understanding of political messages, and acceptance of certain ideas or figures. Based on these findings, it can be concluded that credible, relevant, and communicative digital campaigns have great potential in shaping the political orientation of Generation Z. Therefore, adaptive communication strategies are needed as well as strengthening political and digital literacy among students to encourage more critical and responsible political engagement.

This article examines the effect of political talk radio (PTR) shows on listeners’ political attitudes during the  presidential election in the United States. Two complementary approaches for analyzing panel data (cross-lagged correlations and a fixed-effects conditional logit model) were employed to answer the question of whether the messages of PTR influence the audience or whether the audience is merely selecting sources consistent with its pre-existing political biases. In this context, the current study compares the usefulness of media exposure, on one hand, and political knowledge, on the other, as a tool for uncovering media effects on political attitudes. Three major conclusions result from the panel analyses. First is that the impact of PTR on political attitudes over time is very small at best. Second, when there is evidence of causal association between attitudes toward political figures and media reception, the direction of effect is from attitudes to reception (measured either by PTR exposure or political knowledge). Third, using political knowledge as a surrogate for media reception, instead of simple exposure, did not improve the number or magnitude of the observed associations between PTR messages and attitudes toward political leaders. Call-in political talk radio (PTR) shows offer a unique setting for studying media effects on the formation and change of political attitudes. PTR in the U.S. is a highly partisan medium that is often characterized by intense and one-sided political information to which audiences are repeatedly exposed (Davis ). Under this condition the effect of political messages on audiences’ attitudes is expected to be maximal (Zaller ). Moreover, PTR continues to be a vital interactive medium for the dissemination of political and civic knowledge, and a vibrant forum for exchange of political attitudes and mobilization of political participation (Cappella et al. ). Hence, the information and messages contained in PTR are highly conducive to political socialization The manuscript was first submitted September , . The present version was received March , .  World Association for Public Opinion Research                 and individual learning (Hollander ). Finally, PTR offers a fruitful ground for political communication research because its audience may be relatively easily distinguished by political predispositions and level of exposure. This diversity within and across PTR listeners (including non-listeners) can be effectively used to test hypotheses about the importance of political predispositions and exposure dosages to the prospects of political persuasion. The present study was designed to take advantage of these unique characteristics of PTR shows. The study focuses on the effect of PTR messages on their audiences’ political attitudes with the particular objective of carefully examining the nature of the causal relationship between exposure to highly persuasive political messages in PTRs and political attitude change. We begin with a brief summary of the literature pertaining to the impact of PTR on their audiences and then present several hypotheses regarding the causal association between media exposure and political attitudes change. We then test these hypotheses with five-wave panel data on exposure to PTR shows and listeners’ political attitudes during the  presidential election. IMPACT OF POLITICAL TALK RADIO SHOWS ON THEIR

In times of increasing polarization and political acrimony, fueled by distrust of government and media disinformation, it is ever more important to understand the cognitive mechanisms behind political attitude change. In two experiments, we present evidence that false beliefs about one's own prior attitudes and confabulatory reasoning can lead to lasting changes in political attitudes. In Experiment 1 (N = 140), participants stated their opinions about salient political issues, and using the Choice Blindness Paradigm we covertly altered some of their responses to indicate an opposite position. In the first condition, we asked the participants to immediately verify the manipulated responses, and in the second, we also asked them to provide underlying arguments behind their attitudes. Only half of the manipulations were corrected by the participants. To measure lasting attitude change, we asked the participants to rate the same issues again later in the experiment, as well as one week after the first session. Participants in both conditions exhibited lasting shifts in attitudes, but the effect was considerably larger in the group that confabulated supporting arguments. We fully replicated these findings in Experiment 2 (N = 232). In addition, we found that participants' analytical skill correlated with their correction of the manipulation, whereas political involvement did not. This study contributes to the understanding of how confabulatory reasoning and self-perceptive processes can interact in lasting attitude change. It also highlights how political expressions can be both stable in the context of everyday life, yet flexible when argumentative processes are engaged. (PsycINFO Database Record

The primary assumption within the recent personality and political orientations literature is that personality traits cause people to develop political attitudes. In contrast, research relying on traditional psychological and developmental theories suggests the relationship between most personality dimensions and political orientations are either not significant or weak. Research from behavioral genetics suggests the covariance between personality and political preferences is not causal, but due to a common, latent genetic factor that mutually influences both. The contradictory assumptions and findings from these research streams have yet to be resolved. This is in part due to the reliance on cross-sectional data and the lack of longitudinal genetically informative data. Here, using two independent longitudinal genetically informative samples, we examine the joint development of personality traits and attitude dimensions to explore the underlying causal mechanisms that drive the relationship between these features and provide a first step in resolving the causal question. We find change in personality over a ten-year period does not predict change in political attitudes, which does not support a causal relationship between personality traits and political attitudes as is frequently assumed. Rather, political attitudes are often more stable than the key personality traits assumed to be predicting them. Finally, the results from our genetic models find that no additional variance is accounted for by the causal pathway from personality traits to political attitudes. Our findings remain consistent with the original construction of the five-factor model of personality and developmental theories on attitude formation, but challenge recent work in this area.

PurposeA major justification for the state subsidy of university education at public institutions (and, in some countries, of private universities too) is the economic and social benefits accruing to society as whole from a significantly university-educated workforce and citizenship. Based upon a broad range of research findings, a particular societal benefit emanating from higher education relates to good citizenship: that it leads to more open mindedness and tolerant political attitudes. We examined these issues using a representative sample of students from Israeli universities to clarify the extent to which these outcomes would be paralleled in the Israeli setting, where the university experience differs markedly from that found typically in the West.Design/methodology/approachThe research is based on a comparison of political tolerance levels between first- and final-year students enrolled in regular undergraduate study programs (of four days a week or more). However since a change in tolerance is likely to be contingent also on the amount of time that the student spends on campus during the study year, we introduce, as a control group, students enrolled in compressed study programs (of three days a week or less) and compare changes in their tolerance levels with tolerance changes of students enrolled in regular programs. Research questionnaires were distributed to undergraduate students at three universities from the three major districts in Israel–north, south and center. The achieved sample size was 329 students.FindingsUsing Difference-in-Differences techniques, we looked for any changes in students' general political tolerance, over the course of their studies. Surprisingly, we found no such effect on political tolerance attitudes. Israeli students are older and often married and though nominally full-time students, they often hold down a full-time job. Thus they come and go to attend lectures but do not otherwise spend much time on campus. Given the somewhat perfunctory nature of the university experience for most Israeli students, it does not to lead to more open-minded and tolerant political attitudes.Practical implicationsSome broader, practical applications of the research, beyond the Israeli case, are presented, particularly related to distance learning and to the impact of COVID-19. Attention is given to more recent “Cancel culture” developments on university campuses.Originality/valueThe results have wider implications, to other university setting in other countries. Changes in political attitudes may occur in university settings where campus life is well developed, with opportunities for student interaction, formally in extra-curricular events or through social mixing outside the lecture hall. Where the university experience is more minimally confined to attendance at lectures these desirable outcomes may not be forth coming. These findings are relevant to other university frameworks where campus attendance is marginal, such as in open university education and, even more explicitly, in purely internet-based higher education study.

This analysis of cohort changes in political attitudes reveals that tolerance of ideological nonconformity has been increasing among all cohorts. Aging is not invariably accompanied by greater conservatism, as earlier studies have suggested. Rather, older cohorts are more likely than younger ones to adhere to their earlier, more conservative, attitudes. It is this differential propensity for change that leads to a widening gap between cohort attitudes. Stephen J. Cutler is Associate Professor in the Department of SociologyAnthropology, Oberlin College; Robert L. Kaufman is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin.

Multiple regression and probit are used to test explanations of the post-1964 decline in turnout for presidential elections in nonsouthern states. Twelve socioeconomic and attitudinal variables are used to predict validated voting reports collected in conjunction with the 1964 and 1976 national election studies conducted by the SRC/CPS. Both the regression and probit analyses indicate that political attitudes, like partisanship and concern over the election outcome, have contributed to the decline in turnout; however, education and interest variables have offset the decline attributed to changes in political attitudes. The analysis leaves the puzzle of declining turnout largely unsolved. Alternative explanations of the decline in turnout are discussed.

ABSTRACTSocial movement research indicates that mobilization can effect change in political attitudes, yet few works have systematically tested the effect of protests on public opinion. This article uses survey and protest event data to assess the spatial and temporal effect of mobilizations on political attitudes Chile. It combines the 2008, 2010, and 2012 LAPOP surveys and a dataset of college student protest events, mapping respondents and protests at the municipal level using Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Using regression analyses, it finds that proximity to college student protests has a significant effect on various political attitudes. The effect, however, tends to be substantively larger on “weak” attitudes and smaller on “strong” ones. The results highlight the importance of mobilizations in shaping individual political attitudes and the role that social movements play in the policy-making process.

Over the last few decades, radical right populist (RRP) parties have been electorally successful in different European countries. The success of some of these parties has, however, not been stable. Some RRP parties have indeed been successful at some elections but experienced substantive electoral losses in subsequent elections. The aim of our study is to test the extent to which changes in political attitudes during an electoral cycle relate to the likelihood of voters to switch their voting intentions from any party to a RRP party and from a RRP party to any other party. Taking advantage of Dutch panel data (LISS) collected in 2007, 2010 and 2012 (N = 1,494 for 2007–2010; N = 2,126 for 2010–2012), our binary logistic regression analyses indicate that growing sympathy for the party leader (Geert Wilders) initiates a move to the PVV while decreasing sympathy for Geert Wilders relates to a shift away from the PVV. Changes in attitudes towards immigrants, Euroscepticism and political inefficacy and distrust, do not seem to matter when mean levels for these attitudes are controlled for.

Understanding changes in attitudes towards others is critical to understanding human behaviour. Neuropolitical studies have found that the activation of emotion-related areas in the brain is linked to resilient political preferences, and neuroeconomic research has analysed the neural correlates of social preferences that favour or oppose consideration of intrinsic rewards. This study aims to identify the neural correlates in the prefrontal cortices of changes in political attitudes toward others that are linked to social cognition. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments have presented videos from previous electoral campaigns and television commercials for major cola brands and then used the subjects' self-rated affinity toward political candidates as behavioural indicators. After viewing negative campaign videos, subjects showing stronger fMRI activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex lowered their ratings of the candidate they originally supported more than did those with smaller fMRI signal changes in the same region. Subjects showing stronger activation in the medial prefrontal cortex tended to increase their ratings more than did those with less activation. The same regions were not activated by viewing negative advertisements for cola. Correlations between the self-rated values and the neural signal changes underscore the metric representation of observed decisions (i.e., whether to support or not) in the brain. This indicates that neurometric analysis may contribute to the exploration of the neural correlates of daily social behaviour.

Since just over half of the Swiss voters decided not to join the European Economic Area in 1992, public opinion on the European Union (EU) has consistently become more critical in Switzerland. While macro factors such as the 2008 economic crisis undoubtedly played a role, examining changes within individuals sheds light on why Swiss citizens changed their mind at some point in their life course. Based on previous literature, we predict that both economic and political factors play a role in shaping Swiss citizens’ (un)willingness to join the EU. In contrast to most studies that compare attitudes between individuals, we go a step further and examine how changes within individuals affect changes in attitudes toward the EU. Our analyses of SHP data (1999–2014) show that, in line with previous studies, citizens with a higher social status (e.g., higher education) are more likely to support joining the EU while those holding right-wing values are less likely to do so. When analysing changes within individuals however, we find that above all, changes in political attitudes (e.g., increasingly right-wing, less interest in politics) result in less support for Switzerland joining the EU.

We examined predictors of political attitude change by assessing the independent and interactive effect of social dominance orientation (SDO) as a context-dependent versus an individual difference construct. In a longitudinal study, British students' political orientation was assessed before entering university (T1) and after being at university for 2 months (T2) and 6 months (T3; N=109). Results showed that initial SDO (T1) did not predict political attitudes change nor did it predict self-selected entry into course with hierarchy enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating ideologies. More support was obtained for a contextually determined model whereby SDO (T2) mediated the relationship between social class (T1) and political attitude change (T3). We also found support for mediated moderation in accounting for effects of initial SDO on political attitude change. Findings suggest that SDO as a concept that is sensitive to group dynamics is best suited to explain shifts in political attitudes.

Electoral shocks have spillover effects in democracies, as they can change citizens’ political attitudes and political behaviour across national borders. Yet, electoral shocks also exist in non-democratic regimes. Do electoral shocks likewise lead to spillover within a non-democratic regime? To explore this question, I build on Lohmann’s idea of information cascade and study the spillover of the 2019 Hong Kong local election, in which the opposition won a landslide victory. Using a survey fielded in Macau during this event, I find liberalizing effects among middle-class citizens: after the electoral shock, their democratic commitment increases while their perceived electoral fairness decreases. Conversely, lower-class citizens experience backlash effects as they assess the electoral system more positively and briefly consider democracy as less important. However, these changes in political attitudes do not translate into changes in expressed vote choice and other types of political participation. Regarding the mechanism of the attitudinal change, I suggest such polarized reactions are related to the different information consumption among the two classes. I discuss how these findings contribute to the literature on non-democratic regimes, electoral shocks, and class politics.

Genetic and environmental influences on the stability of political attitudes

We investigated if the COVID-19 pandemic's onset caused changes in political attitudes. Influential theories predict that the pandemic's onset will cause people to adopt more conservative attitudes, more culturally conservative attitudes, or more extreme attitudes. We comprehensively tested the external validity of these predictions by estimating the causal effect of the pandemic's onset on 84 political attitudes and eight perceived threats using fine-grained repeated cross-sectional data (Study 1, N = 232,684) and panel data (Study 2, N = 552) collected in the United States. Although the pandemic's onset caused feelings of threat, the onset only caused limited attitude change (six conservative shifts, four extremity shifts, 12 liberal shifts, 62 no change). Prominent theories of threat and politics did not make accurate predictions for this major societal threat. Our results highlight the necessity of testing psychological theories' predictive powers in real-life circumstances.