Abstract
Until recently, the most interesting application of infinitely repeated games was the study of cooperative oligopolies. Here, an application of the game theory approach is done to the case of the external debt, considering as player the lenders in time periods and some conclusions come abroad in cases of cooperative or non-cooperative strategies. The cooperative strategy can be understood as a concession of additional lendings by the lenders. Analizing the problem of the external debt as a static game, we conclude that the adoption of a cooperative strategy by the lenders can avoid losses implied by a non-cooperative strategy. With base in the approach of repeated games the conclusion is that the cooperative solution can be obtained as a non-cooperative equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game.
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