Abstract
We present methods for estimating the state of the power grid following a cyber-physical attack. We assume that an adversary attacks an area by: (i) disconnecting some lines within that area (failed lines), and (ii) obstructing the information from within the area to reach the control center. Given the phase angles of the nodes outside the attacked area under either the DC or AC power flow models (before and after the attack), the provided methods can estimate the phase angles of the nodes and detect the failed lines inside the attacked area. The novelty of our approach is the transformation of the line failures detection problem, which is combinatorial in nature, to a convex optimization problem. As a result, our methods can detect any number of line failures in a running time that is independent of the number of failures and is solely dependent on the size of the attacked area.
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