Abstract

This article explores the extension of counter-radicalisation practice into the National Health Service (NHS). In the 2011 reformulation of the UK Prevent strategy, the NHS became a key sector for the identification and suppression of ‘radicalisation’. Optometrists, dentists, doctors and nurses have been incorporated into counter-terrorism and trained to report signs of radicalisation in patients and staff. This article explores how calculative modalities associated with big data and digital analytics have been translated into the non-digital realm. The surveillance of the whole of the population through the NHS indicates a dramatic policy shift away from linear profiling of those ‘suspect communities’ previously considered vulnerable to radicalisation. Fixed indicators of radicalisation and risk profiles no longer reduce the sample size for surveillance by distinguishing between risky and non-risky bodies. Instead, the UK government chose the NHS as a pre-eminent site for counter-terrorism because of the large amount of contact it has with the public. The UK government is developing a novel counter-terrorism policy in the NHS around large-N surveillance and inductive calculation, which demonstrates a translation of algorithmic modalities and calculative regimes. This article argues that this translation produces an autoimmune moment in British security discourse whereby the distinction between suspicious and non-suspicious bodies has collapsed. It explores the training provided to NHS staff, arguing that fixed profiles no longer guide surveillance: rather, surveillance inductively produces the terrorist profile.

Highlights

  • The 2011 review of the Prevent strategy undertaken by the UK’s coalition government introduced three new developments in the relationship between health, security and surveillance

  • By situating the new counter-radicalisation duties as a safeguarding measure to protect patients, the Prevent review explicitly refigured the terrorist as one who has suffered ideological abuse: a victim. It further embeds the notion of radicalisation as a pathological process towards terrorism that results from exposure to abusive radicalisers, and which can be recognised through discernible symptoms of ‘extremism’

  • This collapsing of the discursive separation between health and security is the culmination of biopolitical logics, which deploy both risk and pity in their imagination of insecurity (Aradau, 2004; HeathKelly, 2013)

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Summary

Introduction

The 2011 review of the Prevent strategy undertaken by the UK’s coalition government introduced three new developments in the relationship between health, security and surveillance. The Prevent review replicates the calculative modality associated with the algorithm by operationalising whole-of-population surveillance and reporting around unfixed and ambiguous indicators3 of radicalisation.

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