ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS AND ARISTOTLE'S DE ANIMA: WHAT'S IN A COMMENTARY?

Abstract

Abstract A study of testimonia for Alexander's lost commentary on Aristotle's De anima can shed new light on his interpretation of Aristotle. Two cases are discussed. (1) Alexander reads De anima 3.12 (434b3–8) as applying teleological explanation of soul's powers to the souls of heavenly bodies, which in his own treatise De anima he excludes from the scope of psychology. Inclusive reading agrees with Alexander's position in other writings and must be his considered view. (2) Philoponus reports a Platonist (probably Numenius') exegesis of De anima 2.2 (413b11–13). Alexander's argument against it, with parallels in his other psychological writings, provides evidence that his controversial definition of soul as a power supervenient on elemental mixture is due, in part, to his polemic against Platonist readings of Aristotle's theory of soul and soul's powers.