Al-Qaida's Strategic Decisionmaking and 9/11: The “Trap” Theory Revisited

Abstract

1 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXVII, No.3, Spring 2014 Al-Qaida’s Strategic Decisionmaking and 9/11: The “Trap” Theory Revisited Norman Cigar* Introduction The Terms of Reference As the United States draws down its military presence in Afghanistan, it is appropriate to revisit how the war was ignited and, in particular, AlQaida ’s role in that process. An understanding of Al-Qaida’s thinking in preparing and executing this operation provides helpful insights into its decision making system and into its planning process in relation to both overall policy and, specifically, to its decision to launch the 9/11 operation in 2001. While not universal, a widespread view has been that Al-Qaida launched the 9/11 attacks with the express purpose of drawing the United States into Afghanistan, what one can call the “trap theory.” There are two interrelated premises to the trap theory: that Al-Qaida expected the U.S. response to 9/11 would be a ground invasion of Afghanistan and that this was the outcome that Al-Qaida’s leadership desired. Projecting their own calculations of strategy, based on impressions of what Al-Qaida could have or ought to have done onto Bin Ladin, proponents of the trap theory usually affirm such positions as givens without providing supporting *Norman Cigar is a senior Research Fellow at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA. He would like to express his gratitude to the Marine Corps University Foundation for a generous grant which made possible the research and writing of this article, as well as to Drs. Christopher Harmon and Bradley Meyer for their valuable insights and suggestions on an early draft. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U. S. Government, the Department of Defense, the U. S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps University, or the Marine Corps University Foundation. 2 evidence or base their conclusions on logical constructs founded on unproven assumptions. Typically, no convincing evidence is adduced to link Al-Qaida’s very real contemptuous view of U.S. staying power with an alleged policy to lure the United States into Afghanistan by means of 9/11, a strategy which many proponents of the trap theory also saw as linked with previous Al-Qaida attacks that had failed to produce the desired invasion. This study argues that, on the contrary, Al-Qaida did not seek or expect a U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and that the resulting outcome represented a strategic blunder for Al-Qaida’s decisionmakers. And, this study will also suggest another interpretation of Al-Qaida’s intent for 9/11 as an alternative to the trap theory. There is no evidence that Al-Qaida in the planning stage sought such an invasion. On the contrary, there is ample evidence that for Al-Qaida it was an unexpected outcome, given the paradigms and assumptions on which its planning relied—specifically that the United States’ will was weak and that the American military was inept and cowardly—and that, in fact, Al-Qaida tried to deter an invasion when that appeared imminent after 9/11. Moreover, AlQaida ’s paradigms and strategic assumptions, based on an erroneous understanding of the lessons learned from the past, were reflected in their translation into faulty operational planning and in a failure to take concrete measures to prepare for an invasion and a protracted campaign within Afghanistan. On the contrary, Al-Qaida’s own initial denial of responsibility represented a vain attempt to deter an invasion. In fact, Al-Qaida had considerable difficulty in adjusting after it was forced to do so in the wake of 9/11. Likewise, Al-Qaida’s focus on Afghanistan as a secure operational base, also runs counter to the trap theory, according to which the latter was intended as a battlefield. Additional indicators, such as the expectation that Pakistan would not back a U.S. ground operation and the role of Ahmad Shah Masud’s assassination also do not support the trap theory. Conversely, there is strong circumstantial evidence that Al-Qaida had other objectives, some well-defined, others more general, in launching 9/11...