Al-Qaeda's Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network

Abstract

Al-Qaeda is commonly described as a highly flexible and adaptable non-state network, making it difficult for states to combat. Although these features are associated with networks in theory, they are not inherent to networks in practice, and rely largely on organisational learning. A network that fails to learn is not likely to adapt successfully. This paper explores the learning implications of al-Qaeda's transnational network structure, focusing on decentralisation and reduced hierarchical control following the loss of its Afghanistan base. Drawing from organisational theory research, the paper uses an exploration–exploitation framework to offer hypotheses about how learning is evolving. It suggests a wider space for exploration, rendering a dispersed, decentralised al-Qaeda more innovative, balanced by a weakened ability to exploit resources and expertise. Networked al-Qaeda militants are described as ‘innovative improvisers’ with high creative potential but low professionalism. By delving into the mechanisms of learning, the paper builds knowledge of what specific circumstances affect al-Qaeda's purported agility as an actor. Further research is recommended on how states might respond to innovative improvisers. Such research should extend beyond popular proposals for ‘networked’ national security to innovation and learning in their own right.