Al-Junayd’s Epistemic Definition of Monotheism (tawḥīd) and his Theory of Self-Consciousness

Abstract

The objective of this study is to present a new argument for understanding the philosophical roots of Abū al-Qāsim al-Junayd’s (d. 909/297) ambiguous definition of monotheism (tawḥīd). Al-Junayd defines tawḥīd in terms of separating the eternally existing (qadīm) from the temporally generated (muḥdath). This study argues that Plato’s distinction between “that which is and always is” and “that which comes to be and never is” in the Timaeus better clarifies neglected aspects of al-Junayds’s definition than the orthodox Neo-Platonic interpretation put forward by Ali Hassen Abdel Kader. Given the lacuna of historically decisive textual evidence in support of either interpretation, this study will demonstrate how the Platonic distinction, which was widely circulating in the theological and philosophical circles of the ninth and early tenth century Baghdad, better furnishes a more coherent interpretation of al-Junayd’s positions. The first part of the study suggests that al-Junayd’s definition of tawḥīd could best be described as a creatively epistemic appropriation and development of the Platonic essentially metaphysical distinction. Through a careful examination of his theory of self-consciousness, the second part of the study explains how al-Junayd developed his epistemic definition of tawḥīd in response to the charges of pantheism addressed to Sufisms. This examination will further support my claim that a Platonic, rather than a Neo-Platonic, framework better explains the philosophical foundation of al-Junayd’s conception and definition of monotheism. I conclude by indicating how this study’s results contribute to the larger scholarship on philosophy and formation of early Sufism.