Abstract
This chapter attempts to trace the path of moral education by examining Aristotle's distinctions between akrasia , enkrateia , and arete | proper. The condition of a moral agent suffering akrasia is similar in important respects to that of a young person whose rational capacity is not yet sufficiently developed so as to be able to master the strong passions. Similarly, the settled disposition of the enkrates is akin to that of a promising student whose moral education is sufficiently advanced to enable his rational capacity to reliably control his passions. Finally, the person of complete virtue has achieved the stable disposition which is the ultimate purpose of moral education, whereby the passions are brought into harmony with practical reason which guides his actions. The chapter reconstructs Aristotle's account of moral education in terms of different stages of character formation with reference to these different moral conditions. Keywords: akrasia ; Aristotle; complete virtue; moral education
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