Aisth?sis, nous and phron?sis in the practical syllogism

Abstract

One of the perennial problems in understanding Aristotle's theory of practical judgment concerns the so-called practical syllogism. The theoretical syllogistic of the Prior Analytics is ajustly celebrated landmark in man's philosophical joumeyings. However, despite tantalising allusive references, Aristotle notoriously does not provide us with an equally systematic account of practical reasoning. This has led commentators to see how far such an account can be constructed out of the material Aristotle has left us. D. K. Modrak has recently' made a bold attempt to provide a general inferential schema for the practical syllogism, understood as beginning with reasons and ending with an action. Were her thesis correct, we would have been presented with an interpretative tool of great power. However, in my view, Modrak's thesis ultimately fails to represent accurately Aristotle's extremely complex view of how aisthesis ('perception'), nous ('intuition') and phronesis ('practical wisdom') combine in practical judgment and action.2 Moreover, there are general questions which can be raised about the aptness of any attempt to do what Modrak aims to do. Modrak's specific proposal is based upon including in the schema some appropriate propositional attitude towards the sentential components of the practical syllogism. It looks like this: