Abstract
How does how intervener airpower affect civil war parties’ ability to take and hold territory? I argue that airpower can have both short- and long-term effects on an actor's ability to take and hold territory, by reducing its ability to effectively fight its adversary. Using novel, disaggregated data, I conduct a quantitative within-case study of 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya. I find that the NATO air campaign made the Libyan government less likely to capture territory in the short term, and that airstrikes reduced its ability to capture territory in the long term.
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