Abstract
A class of single valued rules for airport problems is considered. The common properties of these rules are efficiency, reasonableness and a weak form of consistency. These solutions are automatically members of the core for the associated airport game. Every weighted Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the modified nucleolus turn out to belong to this class of rules. The τ-value, however, does not to belong to this class. As a side result we prove that, for airport games, the modified nucleolus and the prenucleolus of the dual game coincide. Furthermore, we investigate monotonicity properties of the rules and axiomatize the Shapley value, nucleolus, and modified nucleolus on the class of airport games.
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