Abstract

This study addresses the problem of hub airport privatization in a domestic airline market, where each country has one major hub airport and multiple local airports. We find that when both countries have very small domestic airline markets, airport privatization occurs at the Nash equilibrium. However, when at least one country has a large domestic airline market, the public airport becomes an equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, depending on the number of airline markets and degree of product differentiation, an asymmetric equilibrium may appear.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.