Abstract
Exposure to infected poultry is a suspected cause of avian influenza (H5N1) virus infections in humans. We detected infectious droplets and aerosols during laboratory-simulated processing of asymptomatic chickens infected with human- (clades 1 and 2.2.1) and avian- (clades 1.1, 2.2, and 2.1) origin H5N1 viruses. We detected fewer airborne infectious particles in simulated processing of infected ducks. Influenza virus–naive chickens and ferrets exposed to the air space in which virus-infected chickens were processed became infected and died, suggesting that the slaughter of infected chickens is an efficient source of airborne virus that can infect birds and mammals. We did not detect consistent infections in ducks and ferrets exposed to the air space in which virus-infected ducks were processed. Our results support the hypothesis that airborne transmission of HPAI viruses can occur among poultry and from poultry to humans during home or live-poultry market slaughter of infected poultry.
Highlights
Since 2003, approximately 850 human cases of Eurasian A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (Gs/GD) lineage H5N1 virus infection have been reported; case-fatality rate is 53% [1,2,3]
We determined that viable airborne highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus particles were generated during simulated processing of HPAI virus–infected poultry and that the airborne virus was transmitted to virus-naive poultry and mammals
Zhou et al showed that viable H5, H7, and H9 avian influenza (AI) viruses with human zoonotic potential are detectable in the air of live-poultry markets (LPM) in China [12]
Summary
Since 2003, approximately 850 human cases of Eurasian A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (Gs/GD) lineage H5N1 virus infection have been reported; case-fatality rate is 53% [1,2,3]. Most human infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) subtype H5N1 virus have occurred following direct or indirect exposure to infected poultry in live-poultry markets (LPM) in developing countries [1,2,3]. The main risk factors associated with human infections include visiting an LPM or performing activities with intensive contact with infected poultry, like slaughtering, defeathering, or preparing poultry for cooking [3,4]. Poultry-to-human avian influenza (AI) virus transmission can occur from 3 types of exposure: fomite-contact transmission, including contact with contaminated surfaces; droplet transmission, in which large (>5 μm) particles contact a person’s conjunctiva or respiratory mucosa; and droplet nuclei transmission (or aerosol transmission), in Author affiliations: US Department of Agriculture, Athens, Georgia, USA We determined that viable airborne HPAI virus particles were generated during simulated processing of HPAI virus–infected poultry and that the airborne virus was transmitted to virus-naive poultry and mammals
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