Abstract
During the fighting in the Western Desert of North Africa, the Royal Air Force conducted a land‐based interdiction campaign against Axis motorized transport supply columns which was guided by intelligence. It was this campaign, and not the Ultra‐driven sea interdiction campaign, which was responsible for the destruction of the bulk of Axis supply. The impact of land‐based interdiction totally destroyed the morale and fighting ability of the Axis forces at El Alamein in late 1942, and set a pattern for operations which was replayed with success throughout the remainder of the war.
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