Abstract

Taiwan's foreign aid policy is largely a response to its China-imposed international isolation. Taiwan provides aid without stringent accountability conditions to countries in Africa, the Americas, and the South Pacific in order to maintain official diplomatic relations in the face of Chinese opposition. Often at odds with this is Taiwan's interest in seeking western support through being seen as a responsible aid donor. Domestic political constraints on Taiwan's aid budget accentuate the tension between these two interests. Taiwan's aid program can be seen as the product of these three competing and enduring pressures – maintaining the count of official diplomatic relationships, improving its international reputation, and containing aid spending.Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's tacit ‘diplomatic truce’ with China – part of a wider warming of intergovernmental relations across the Taiwan Strait – has reduced significantly the squeeze between these three pressures on Taiwan's foreign aid policy. It has allowed the Ma administration to improve Taiwan's reputation, while maintaining or even reducing its aid expenditure, and still retain the same number of official diplomatic relationships. Nevertheless, the Ma administration has not wanted to alienate recipient governments while the prospects for the diplomatic truce with China remain uncertain. There remains considerable continuity with past practices, and the government's handling of aid as a foreign policy tool is still largely opaque and unaccountable.

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