Aid for justice? Analyzing the impact of foreign aid on recipient transitional justice implementation

Abstract

ABSTRACT Some limited scholarship, focused on the US as donor, links the allocation of foreign aid to the implementation of transitional justice (TJ) mechanisms in post-authoritarian recipient states. However, no scholarship systematically examines the link between aid from the global donor population and the implementation of TJ mechanisms more generally. Further, we know little about how foreign aid influences the types of mechanisms that recipients implement because of aid. According to work on the ‘justice cascade,’ the international community (i.e. donor states) advance criminal accountability of former perpetrators in the transitional process, often at the expense of other transitional goals. In this piece, we first look at the link between the allocation of aid and the likelihood of adoption of TJ mechanisms in post-authoritarian recipient states, arguing that donors emphasize the use of aid for criminal accountability in recipient states. We then explore the role political risk plays in determining the allocation of aid to post-authoritarian recipient states, arguing that in states with higher levels of political risk donors are less likely to give aid. Our expectations are broadly and consistently confirmed.