Abstract
ABSTRACT The “developmental state” has become a prominent alternative development model defended by contemporary Western aid donors, particularly in Africa. Purported “developmental states,” such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, are argued to possess strong-willed, visionary leaderships whose commitment to delivering on ambitious development plans renders them attractive donor partners. These leaderships are also, however, often authoritarian and unapologetic when criticized for democratic backsliding or human rights abuses. For many Western donors this represents a tolerable trade-off. The purpose of this article is to interrogate, critique and explain the assumptions and ideas underlying this trade-off. Using the case study of Ethiopia, we argue that donor officials’ understandings of “developmental state” are varied, vague and superficial, the main commonality being a “strong” regime with “political will” and a non-negotiable approach to domestic governance. We suggest that donors have too readily and uncritically accepted, internalized and deployed these notions, using the “developmental state” concept to justify their withdrawal from serious engagement on democratic reform. This derives from a systemic donor preference for depoliticized development models, as well as from Ethiopian officials’ own savvy political manoeuvrings. It has also, however, weakened donors’ position of influence at a time when the Ethiopian regime is debating major political reform.
Highlights
First conceptualized during the 1980s in relation to Japan, the “developmental state” has become a prominent alternative development model defended by contemporary Western aid donors, – since the mid-2000s – in Africa
We suggest that Western donors have too readily internalized these broad notions, using the “developmental state” concept to narrate their voluntary withdrawal from serious engagement on democratic reform or human rights abuses
“All development partners [donors] fall in line,” as one aid worker observed, “there is very little pushback. They could push more but don’t.”51 “There are trade-offs working with the Government of Ethiopia,” suggested officials from one bilateral donor, “but there are benefits of doing it their way ... because we deliver on the national [development] plan.”52 Many respondents presented the development/democracy trade-off as an acceptable means to help “craft portfolios like health and education, so you can be more strategic in the longer-term.”53 several interviewees suggested that opening up Ethiopia’s political system would be counterproductive: “human rights views are disadvantaging the people of Ethiopia,” argued one European official, “opposition parties would have a similar approach to governing [to the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)] but would do a worse job.”54
Summary
First conceptualized during the 1980s in relation to Japan, the “developmental state” has become a prominent alternative development model defended by contemporary Western aid donors, – since the mid-2000s – in Africa. Government perspective on development and a very clear vision [compared to Uganda].”49 According to a UN official, “you can trust Ethiopia more than Kenya.”50 This understanding of developmental progress and authoritarian rule as interdependent in Ethiopia has led to a second point of consensus across the donor community: that pressuring Addis Ababa on lack of democratization is undesirable or even, perhaps, counterproductive for securing longer-term developmental gains. Because we deliver on the national [development] plan.” Many respondents presented the development/democracy trade-off as an acceptable means to help “craft portfolios like health and education, so you can be more strategic in the longer-term.” several interviewees suggested that opening up Ethiopia’s political system would be counterproductive: “human rights views are disadvantaging the people of Ethiopia,” argued one European official, “opposition parties would have a similar approach to governing [to the EPRDF] but would do a worse job.”. The country will lose the gains [it has made] if it falls apart,” and called human rights “necessary for long-term development.” The 2016–2017 protests and emergence of Abiy Ahmed as prime minister in 2018 – both of which donors observed with surprise, from the sidelines – underscores exactly this point, and the risks of a donor approach to Ethiopia that ignores popular demands for change
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