Aid Agencies, States, and Collective Harm

Abstract

Many critics of aid agencies1 have observed that the main challenge facing such organizations takes the form of a collective action problem. The most familiar versions of such problems are those in which each individual is tempted, out of self-interest, to ‘defect’ from cooperating toward the realization of some collective project or goal. Prisoner’s Dilemma is the best-known of this sort of problem, and, if some well-informed critics are correct, this framework is not irrelevant to thinking about the morality of aid agencies, particularly when it comes to issues such as competing for financial donors (Maren 1997, Sogge 2002). However, there is another, less widely-discussed, class of collective action problem that arises not out of self-interest but rather out of altruistic motivation. For it is a surprising fact that collective action problems can arise when everyone is motivated to further the interests of others no less than when they are motivated to further the interests of only themselves.