Abstract
With the growing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) in determining pricing strategies, there is an increasing concern about its potential to foster collusive behavior. Harrington (2012, 2018) underscores the challenge: if AI proves more adept at tacit collusion than humans or if AI-driven collusion is inherently tacit, then it presents a significant hurdle for prosecution under the prevailing interpretation of US antitrust laws. Validating these concerns, Assad et al. (2020) observed collusive price surges linked to the adoption of pricing algorithms among German gas stations. Drawing from game theory—specifically the repeated game paradigm—this paper crafts a foundational mathematical model to analyze competition versus collusion dynamics. It also evaluates the resultant welfare implications of both scenarios. The paper further delves into the broader challenges posed by AI-powered pricing and advocates for potential policy countermeasures, including algorithmic regulation and collusion detection mechanisms.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
More From: Transactions on Computer Science and Intelligent Systems Research
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.