Agnosticism and the Ethics of Belief: Are there Moral Reasons to Suspend Judgement on God’s Existence?

Abstract

This article will draw from two central notions of normative epistemic interest: ‘It is wrong to maintain a belief despite the awareness that it is not supported by evidence,’ and ‘If the evidence is inconclusive or otherwise insufficient to support a decision, one should not make a judgement.’ Both of these sentiments are captured in philosophical thought, the former in the ethics of belief, the latter in agnosticism. It will be examined how an overlap of these inclinations can be spelt out and whether it holds for the locus classicus of agnosticism: religious belief in the existence of God/gods. More specifically, whether a moderate and modern version of moral evidentialism can provide arguments for being agnostic or support existing agnostic theories. The core premise which will be defended here is that in certain cases there can be moral reasons for suspending judgement when the evidence is inconclusive. Where beliefs become morally relevant, i.e., through the actions we base on them, there are not only epistemic but also moral reasons to carefully stick to the evidence. It will then be argued that the belief in God’s/gods’ (non-)existence is such a case. Both religious and atheist convictions can be of great practical relevance on a personal and societal level. Through their impact and authority, they hold moral stakes and have to be founded on a solid evidential base. Finally, the article provides agnostic arguments to show that such an evidential base has not yet been met and ends with an appeal to reconsider the authority of atheist and theist convictions, especially in a secularizing and religiously pluralistic society.