Abstract
Experiences of agency—or “agentive experiences” as I shall call them—have not received the attention from either philosophers of action or philosophers of consciousness that they deserve. Philosophers of action have tended to ignore the questions raised by the phenomenology of agency in favor of those that concern the identity conditions of actions or the logical structure of action-ascribing sentences, and philosophers of mind have tended to ignore the phenomenology of agency in favor of that of perception and bodily sensations. However, this unhappy state of affairs is beginning to change, and there is now a burgeoning literature dedicated to exploring various aspects of the phenomenology of agency.1
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