Abstract
Airport slot allocation is a combinatorial allocation problem involving different complex and autonomous systems. Nowadays, airport slots are allocated in a two-stage process: primary allocation is performed according to a set of administrative rules and for each airport independently, while secondary allocation is based on trading mechanisms. Several studies have raised inefficiencies in these processes. To enhance the airport slot allocation process we use an auction-based market. More specifically, we present an airport slot allocation mechanism based on a price-setting auction that has been implemented and evaluated by means of Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) and simulation techniques. The solutions obtained using our approach are compared and assessed with the ones obtained using linear programing, showing that market mechanisms can be an efficient alternative to the current administrative procedure.
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