Abstract
We study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals. We show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form vote trading coalitions favoring early proposals not only when the sequence of proposals is exogenously given, but also when a chair controls the sequence of proposals. Vote trading occurs even though chairs manipulate the agenda in their favor. Punishment for chairs exploiting agenda control is weak as chairs reciprocate support by others more frequently than nonchairs. (JEL C92, D71, D72)
Highlights
Committees frequently decide sequentially on series of independent binary proposals
Our results suggest that vote trading based on trust and reciprocity is more likely to occur in situations in which a committee chair determines the agenda
Our results demonstrate that coalitions do occur even without commitment devices and communication, and that agenda manipulation does not impede vote trading based on trust and reciprocity but may even emphasize it
Summary
Committees frequently decide sequentially on series of independent binary proposals. In politics, committees vote sequentially on independent issues (such as funding for highways in region A, bridges in region B, and dams in region C). In firms, committees decide on different projects sequentially. In an open ballot treatment, individual voting behavior is observable The latter two conditions allow us to exogenously change the extent to which committee members can direct reward for support by others and thereby allow us to exogenously vary by how much the voting environment allows for trust and reciprocity to matter. Members who suffer from the chosen agenda, instead, vote less frequently for the chair’s proposal This attribution of blame does occur mostly if individual votes are not observable and is not sufficient to stop chairs from choosing a sequence that favors their own proposal. Our results suggest that vote trading based on trust and reciprocity is more likely to occur in situations in which a committee chair determines the agenda. Our results show that the increase in trust is dampened by negative reactions of committee members, whose proposals are placed last on the agenda, whereas reward behavior increases with an agenda setter
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