Agency Responsiveness to the Legislative Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: A Case Study of Rules Review in the Illinois General Assembly

Abstract

Students of public administration have long maintained that for bureaucratic power to be in balance with constitutional democracy, it must be exercised by a responsible bureaucracy. Legislative oversight is one means by which to secure the responsible exercise of this power. However, little is known regarding why agencies are responsive to oversight. In this article this question is explored by presenting a case study of bureaucratic responsiveness to a highly specialized and routine approach to oversight found in state legislatures—the legislative review of administrative rule-making or "rules review." Five factors that appear to explain agency responsiveness are presented as analytical generalizations that may find application elsewhere; these include the lack of relevance that oversight may have for many legislators, the availability of sanctions that can be applied against nonresponsive agencies, the working relationship between an oversight committee and the agencies, agency costs associated with responsiveness, and the oversight committee's faithfulness to the legislature's original intent.