Agency, Kinship and the Case of the Northern Kingdom of Israel

Abstract

ABSTRACT Scholars who study the Northern Kingdom of Israel repeatedly refer to it as a centralised state or kingdom and often take a neo-evolutionary approach in their assessments of its character. This paper argues for a different approach, one in which the agency of northern Israelite actors/taxpayers and their intricate kinship-based networks are highlighted. It applies collective action theory, which states that rational social actors cooperate with rulers, and the patrimonial household model, which states that social order is viewed as the extension of the ruler’s (and god’s) household, to an analysis of administration and cult in northern Israel during the Iron II. It argues that the Omrides benefited from taxpayer cooperation and a reliance on complex kin-based systems. The same can be said for the Nimshides who, it is suggested, were operating within an even less centralised system than their predecessors.