Abstract
I investigate whether formal presidential authority over agencies moderates attributions of responsibility for agency activity. Using a survey experiment that manipulates news coverage of a major agency scandal, I find that providing details about formal presidential control in news coverage significantly increases attributions of responsibility to the president. I then explore broader questions of accountability by assessing mass media attention to agencies. I use a unique data set of over 150,000 newspaper articles, matched to agency design and regulatory activity data sets, and find considerable variation in total coverage and coverage that mentions the president along with the agency. Combined, the results suggest that media coverage of agency design affects how voters allocate blame for agency actions and that political accountability is hindered by minimal media attention to a large number of agencies that wield significant regulatory powers.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
