Agency controls and subsidiary strategic initiatives: The mediating role of subsidiary autonomy

Abstract

Prior studies examining the impact of organizational controls on subsidiaries’ strategic initiatives have to a large extent failed to find a significant direct association between the two. We argue that this lack of direct association may be due to the fact that the control mechanisms used exert their influence on subsidiaries’ strategic initiatives indirectly by suppressing subsidiaries’ decision-making autonomy. Drawing upon agency theory we consider the effects of two types of controls, monitoring and incentive alignment, as mediated by subsidiaries’ decision-making autonomy. We test this effect on data from 115 subsidiaries of foreign multinationals operating in Greece. The results of our analyses empirically validate this assertion for both mechanisms. Our findings further show that, when both mechanisms are present, one may accentuate the effect of the other, highlighting the value of employing a contingency approach to fully capture the effects of organizational controls on the pursuit of subsidiaries’ strategic initiatives.