Agency and the Open Question Argument

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Previous articleNext article No AccessAgency and the Open Question Argument*Connie S. RosatiConnie S. Rosati Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 113, Number 3April 2003Centenary Symposium on G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/345625 Views: 284Total views on this site Citations: 35Citations are reported from Crossref © 2003 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Danielle Swanepoel The possibility of deliberate norm-adherence in AI, Ethics and Information Technology 23, no.22 (May 2020): 157–163.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09535-1J. L. 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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, Social Philosophy and Policy 29, no.11 (Dec 2011): 81–105.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052511000069Stan Husi Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self-Defeating, European Journal of Philosophy (Feb 2011): no–no.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00454.xDavid Alm, Michael DePaul, Defending Fundamental Requirements of Practical Reason, Journal of Philosophical Research 36 (Jan 2011): 77–102.https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2011_8Ariela Tubert Constitutive Arguments, Philosophy Compass 5, no.88 (Jul 2010): 656–666.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00318.xConnie S. Rosati XV-Self-Interest and Self-Sacrifice, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 109, no.1pt31pt3 (Oct 2009): 311–325.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00269.xDavid Enoch How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?, The Journal of Ethics 13, no.11 (Sep 2008): 15–50.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-008-9041-zConnie S. 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