Abstract

ABSTRACT The conventional wisdom says that material and structural constraints push small states into a more or less predictable foreign and security policy. Georgia’s case shows that, together with these limitations, the foreign policy of small states is also influenced by the way the ruling elites perceive the smallness of their state. This article explains why at different periods of time Georgia demonstrated diverging and even contradictory foreign policy behaviours, despite not achieving significant economic and military strength or witnessing crucial systemic changes in its security environment. I argue that the way ruling elites interpreted smallness influenced their understanding of Georgia’s foreign policy capacity and agency in the international system. This in turn pushed Georgia into fundamentally different paths, stretching from a passive and mostly reactive foreign policy to a highly ambitious, uncompromising and hawkish one.

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