Against the speaker-intention theory of demonstratives

Christopher Gauker

doi:10.1007/s10988-018-9239-x

Abstract

It is commonly supposed that an utterance of a demonstrative, such as “that”, refers to a given object only if the speaker intends it to refer to that object. This paper poses three challenges to this theory. First, the theory threatens to beg the question by defining the content of the speaker’s intention in terms of reference. Second, the theory makes psychologically implausible demands on the speaker. Third, the theory entails that there can be no demonstratives in thought.

Highlights

It is commonly supposed that an utterance of a demonstrative, such as ‘‘that’’, refers to a given object only if the speaker intends it to refer to that object
I want to argue against a number of authors that the following theory of demonstrative reference is false: The speaker-intention theory of demonstrative reference: An object o is the reference of an utterance of ‘‘that’’ only if o is what the speaker intends to refer to in making that utterance of ‘‘that’’
My three challenges qualify as a critique of the speakerintention theory, because I expect that some readers will be persuaded that these challenges are probably insurmountable or that it is best to look elsewhere for a theory of the reference of demonstratives

Summary

The dirty fork

Imagine that we are seated at a table in a restaurant. I look at the fork next to my plate. Gauker intending to refer is enough to secure a reference, my utterance of ‘‘that’’ refers to the dirty fork on my left, and my utterance of the sentence ‘‘That is dirty’’ is true. If additional conditions have to be fulfilled, such as that the hearer has to be in a position to recognize my intention, my utterance of ‘‘that’’ may fail to refer to anything and in that case my utterance of the sentence ‘‘That is dirty’’ will be neither true nor false. The one possibility that is ruled out, according to these authors, is that my utterance of ‘‘that’’ refers to the fork in front of me and my utterance of the whole sentence is false. My three challenges qualify as a critique of the speakerintention theory, because I expect that some readers will be persuaded that these challenges are probably insurmountable or that it is best to look elsewhere for a theory of the reference of demonstratives

The framework

Some examples of the speaker-intention theory

First objection: the threat of begging the question

Second objection: psychological implausibility

Demonstratives in thought

The dirty fork revisited