Abstract
The chapter considers rival explanations of the data presented in chapter 3 which are compatible with the Semantic View. These accounts are argued to be inferior, in the light of standard methodological principles, to the hypothesis that global evaluations project and are deniable or defeasible in ways that semantic entailments aren’t. Further support for this claim is that, unlike on the Semantic View, regarding a thick concept as objectionable does not commit one to regarding it as empty, and denials of global evaluations that such a concept is used to convey need not involve using it nonliterally. It is also argued that there is license to treat various denials of global evaluations as cases of “metalinguistic negation” which is targeted at aspects of utterances other than their literal semantic content. This concludes the argument against the Semantic View.
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