Against the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality: Deconstructing a Philosophical Myth

Abstract

Evolutionary ethics debunks moral realism – or value realism in general (Street S, Philos Studi 127:109–166, 2006) – but this is not the same as debunking the authority of moral claims, for moral realism is not the only possible explanation of the source of moral authority. However, a few influential evolutionary philosophers do believe that evolution debunks not just moral realism, but morality, period (Joyce R, The evolution of morality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006; Ruse M, Taking Darwin seriously. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986). My main purpose in this paper is to highlight the difference between these two versions of debunking, and to extricate evolutionary theory from being publicly associated with debunking morality, period. Briefly summarized, the latter view is linked to the claim that unless one believes (however falsely) in the objectivity of moral injunctions, the experience of their peculiar authority will not be available. This claim is an unexpected survival of a basic tenet of moral realism, namely, that moral norms derive their authority from objective realities. It is unfortunate to see this claim survive in evolutionary ethicists. They should rather embrace the view that the universal authority of moral norms is vindicated via a set of evolved, socially conditioned, psychological constraints on self-interest, none of which include a belief in the mind-independent objectivity of value.