Abstract
According to a prominent suggestion in the ethics of transcranial neurostimulation the effects of such devices can be treated as ethically on par with established, pre-neurotechnological alterations of the mind. This parity allegedly is supported by situated cognition theories showing how external devices can be part of a cognitive system. This article will evaluate this suggestion. It will reject the claim, that situated cognition theories support ethical parity. It will however point out another reason, why external carriers or modifications of the mental might come to be considered ethically on par with internal carriers. Section “Why Could There Be Ethical Parity between Neural Tissue and External Tools?” presents the ethical parity theses between external and internal carriers of the mind as well as neurotechnological alterations and established alterations. Section “Extended, Embodied, Embedded: Situated Cognition as a Relational Thesis” will elaborate the different situated cognition approaches and their relevance for ethics. It will evaluate, whether transcranial stimulation technologies are plausible candidates for situated cognition theses. Section “On the Ethical Relevance of Situated Cognition Theses” will discuss criteria for evaluating whether a cognitive tool is deeply embedded with a cognitive system and apply these criteria to transcranial brain stimulation technologies. Finally it will discuss the role diverse versions of situated cognition theory can play in the ethics of altering mental states, especially the ethics of transcranial brain stimulation technologies.
Highlights
The most widespread ethical concern regarding brain-stimulation technologies, be they invasive or transcranial, results from their potential of modifying the mind
I will portray these suggestions for revising the neuroethics of brain stimulation in section Why Could There Be Ethical Parity between Neural Tissue and External Tools?
Drawing on situated cognition approaches, several sets of criteria for evaluating whether a cognitive tool is deeply embedded with a cognitive system have been suggested
Summary
The most widespread ethical concern regarding brain-stimulation technologies, be they invasive or transcranial, results from their potential of modifying the mind. In order to banish this image and highlight the pressing ethical issues in brain stimulation technology it has been suggested to treat the effects of such devices as ethically on par with established, pre-neurotechnological alterations of the mind, such as psychotherapy or mnemonics (Levy, 2007a,b; Fenton and Alpert, 2008) This parity is allegedly supported by situated. In his book length treatise (Levy, 2007a) he elaborates the claim of ethical parity between different modifications and carriers of mental states He suggests an ethical parity thesis, providing a strong version, which relies on the theory of extended mind, and a weak version which makes use of the embedded mind theory only. First let me provide a short but telling example of how the ethical parity theses have been received and used in bioethical deliberation
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