Abstract
A recent political proposal to address the challenge of technological unemployment suggests that the state should impose a tax on labor-replacing technologies. The idea is to preserve jobs by disincentivizing automation. In this article, I critically assess the proposal from an ethical perspective. I show that, with respect to conceptions of distributive justice, it is unclear that precluding consumers’ potential real-income gains from automation can be justified. But foremost, I examine the moral ideal behind the normative claim to preserve labor. I show that the arguments in favor of a robot tax rely on doubtful moral convictions on the value of work and I conclude that a moral basis for imposing a robot tax is subject to justified scrutiny.
Highlights
Distinguished economists have argued that the number of jobs could soon be taken over by artificial intelligence AI [1]
The group of taxpayers is almost identical to the group composed of consumers. Those who object to RT because it increases consumers prices would have to object to a redistributive scheme that leads to an increase in taxes
I will outline different ideas to support of securing labor that conceive of work as a constitutive part of the good life
Summary
Distinguished economists have argued that the number of jobs could soon be taken over by artificial intelligence AI [1]. The proposal is hotly debated in the public Illustrious entrepreneurs, such as Bill Gates, opted for the idea of RT: “The robot that takes your job should pay taxes.” [13]. In "Distributive policies and the value of work", I take a step back and ask whether it is desirable at all to protect employment from automation, and outline a prominent argument for this protection, which relies on the assumption of an intrinsic value of work. I will show that the normative assumption of a value of work does not necessarily hold for the future
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