Against Normative Damages

Abstract

Abstract This paper examines an idea which has made some headway into legal scholarship and case law, namely, that the violation of a right ought to sound in substantial (compensatory) damages in and by itself, independently of any factual loss caused to the claimant. This doctrine of ‘normative damages’ was rejected, rightly, by the High Court of Australia in the wrongful imprisonment case of Lewis v. ACT in 2020. However, although the rejection was unanimous, its clarity was undermined by the fact that the issue of normative damages was intertwined with considerations of causal counterfactuals and the definition of false imprisonment. This article considers the doctrine in a broader perspective, examining where it has come from and arguing that normative damages are wrong as a matter of principle: not only do they contradict foundational principles of the Anglo-Commonwealth law of damages, they effectively amount to considering the same injury twice.