Against Intuitive Horribleness

Joel Michael Reynolds

doi:10.1017/epi.2021.42

Abstract

AbstractTestimony by disabled people concerning the relationship between their experiences and overall well-being has long been an object of social scientific and humanistic study. Often discussed in terms of “the disability paradox,” these studies contrast the intuitive horribleness of certain impaired states against the testimonial evidence suggesting that people in such states do not in fact experience their lives as horrible. Explanations for why such testimonial evidence is suspect range from claims about adaptive preferences to issues of qualitative research methodology. In this paper, I argue that the problem lies not with the evidence, but the intuitions in question. Using the disability paradox as a case study, I further argue against the use of the concept of intuitive horribleness in social epistemology. I contend that testimonial and hermeneutical injustices are baked into most deployments of the concept, and even if one were to justify its use in select cases, it should be accompanied with prima facie suspicion. In conclusion, I discuss the implications of this analysis for the literature on transformative experience and also for the stakes of multi-cultural, historically informed philosophical analyses more generally.

Highlights

Often discussed in terms of “the disability paradox,” a contrast is typically set up between the intuitive horribleness of certain impaired states and the testimonial evidence suggesting that people in such states do not experience their lives as horrible
The intuitive horribleness asserted relative to this problem is a species of the disability paradox and one that conflates the value of an epistemically transformative experience with that of a personally transformative experience
I have argued that testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are baked into most deployments of the concept of intuitive horribleness, and that, even if one were to justify its use in select cases, it should be accompanied with prima facie suspicion

Summary

The real sharky problem

I claimed above that the implications of the “shark problem” are wrong for two reasons: (A) the experiential kinds under discussion are indefensibly diverse and fail to characterize the core issue of personally transformative experience, and (B) the real “shark problem” has been misidentified as a merely epistemological concern without taking into account its normative dimensions. Therein lies the rub: philosophical investigation into lived experience involves dimensions that go far beyond both testimony and intuition Consider how common it is for able-bodied people to think they know something about disability insofar as they can “imagine” what it is to be without an ability they have, often assuming that “disability” means the lack of some given ability.. The reasons we give for how and why we experience a given phenomenon as we do turn not merely on our ability to cognitively model things and on how other people offer testimony concerning their own related experiences as well as the vast array of information available to understand the meaning of such claims.. Evidence from other sources, including any number of humanistic, social scientific, and scientific approaches, is requisite

The disability paradox and epistemic injustice

Conclusion