Against Deflationary Semanticism in Metaphysics

Abstract

Semanticism, often using the problem of persistence as its flagship, had argued that metaphysics disputes are merely verbal and can be resolved by appeal to ordinary language. Hence, metaphysics is not a substantive discipline. This position threatens the importance of metaphysics as the basis of all rational activities. This paper identified the absurdity and inconsistencies in semanticism. This is with the aim of showing that metaphysics is a substantive branch of philosophy. The paper made use of relevant texts. Data collected from these texts were subjected to close reading. The paper used the methods of conceptual analysis, critical analysis and philosophical argumentation to acheive its objective. The paper concludes that, contrary to the position of Semanticism, there is no sufficient evidence that metaphysical disputes are mere verbal disputes, as Semanticism fails to show that ordinary language can resolve metaphysical disputes. Subsequently, metaphysics is a substantive branch of philosophy.