Abstract
This paper focuses on decision-making by voting in systems at all levels: the grass-root organization, the community, the nation and the international system. It examines several possible reasone why Condorcet's rule for electing m out of n candidates (where 1 ≤ m < n and n ≥ 3) has hitherto not been implemented in any public elections, despite the fact that this rule was proposed over 200 years ago and is recognized in the social-choice literature as superior to all other known majoritarian voting procedures, in terms of the normative criteria used for evaluating such procedures. It is argued that although some of the objections to implementing Condorcet's proposal may have been valid in the past, none seems to be valid any longer. In connection with one of these objections — the possible existence of cycles in the social preference ordering — we describe three solutions that refine Condorcet's original proposal. A call is made for the actual implementation of Condorcet-type procedures.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
