Abstract

Conclusions * NATO's firm commitment to complete its military mission in Bosnia and withdraw Implemen-tation Forces (IFOR) in 12 months time means that strategic planners should already be thinking about the post-IFOR period. * IFOR will leave behind a fragile peace. Some civilian objectives are almost certain to be delayed, if only due to formidable logistics and technical obstacles. As a result, preserving peace could mean a longer military presence. * A force smaller than IFOR but more robust than traditional UN peacekeeping forces could be required for another 1-2 years in order for peace to last. * Three planning factors are pivotal to an IFOR follow-on force. First, U.S. ground combat forces will be withdrawn, or at least sharply reduced. Second, substantial NATO and U.S. resources will be required to support any follow-on force. Third, like IFOR, a follow-on force needs to be strictly limited in mission and duration. * If an IFOR follow-on force is needed, options include: 1. A second, smaller NATO-led force (IFOR II). Both U.S. and Russian ground combat forces could be withdrawn. 2. A Western European Union (WEU) directed force. The WEU could supplant NATO, using NATO's concept for a WEU-led Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). 3. A Gulf War-style ad hoc coalition. A European-led coalition could be formed under a lead nation, such as the United Kingdom or France. * Of these options, only a NATO-led force would be capable of enforcing peace by December 1996, when IFOR redeploys. * After civilian implementation takes hold, any continuing military presence should be reduced to traditional peacekeeping forces or observers, under the UN or the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Assessing Post-IFOR Missions A post-IFOR force might be considered if some IFOR missions had to continue beyond 12 months. IFOR's missions are defined in Annex 1A (Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement) of the Dayton Agreement. The essential peace enforcement tasks can be summarized as follows: * Enforce continuation of the October 5, 1995 cessation of hostilities. * Establish and enforce the Zone of Separation (ZOS) and other boundaries. * Enforce the transfer of territories agreed to at Dayton. The intent of IFOR's military tasks is to create the broad security environment needed to accomplish the political, economic and social reconstructions which are the keys to lasting peace. IFOR has defined its support for civilian implementation as being to: Help create secure conditions for the conduct of non-military tasks by others. * Assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other international organizations in humanitarian missions and movement needs. * Assist in the observation and prevention of interference in the movement of civilian populations and refugees, and respond appropriately to deliberate violence. * Assist in the monitoring and clearance of minefields and obstacles. Civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement, on which sustained peace depends, will take far longer than IFOR's own mission. Therefore, an important question is, 'will a contnued military presence be required in order to maintain the security essential to civilian implementation?' That is, how long will peace enforcement be necessary? If potentially longer than IFOR's deployment, a follow-on force should be considered. The Acceptable End State for IFOR When IFOR withdraws, world leaders will want to be satisfied that peace is durable and that new institutions can survive IFOR's departure. Civilian undertakings within the first 12 months bear heavily on the chances for continued peace. The list of tasks includes: restoration of key services, holding free and fair elections, establishing basic institutions of government, and concluding arms control agreements. …

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