"African Land Reform Policies: The Case of Sierra Leone": Reply

Abstract

In his comments, Omotunde E. G. Johnson raises several thought-provoking arguments on land tenure systems and change. A thorough discussion of all the points raised in his discussion would reveal considerable disagreement between us, but would appropriately be the subject of a lengthy dissertation. Hence, I will concentrate my reply on the main thrust of his argument. It is my contention that Johnson has too narrow a view of the role of economics in public policy analysis. He overemphasizes the analysis of efficiency criteria, neglects the role of income distribution, ignores the concepts of analytical institutional economics, and overlooks the cardinal rule that in public policy analysis, all relevant alternatives must be considered. The major deficiency in Johnson's analysis is its single-minded concentration on the efficiency criterion, to the exclusion of all other forms of economic analysis or other criteria for public policy evaluation. Although it is relevant to examine the efficiency implications of various policy choices, efficiency is not the only criterion for analyzing public policy alternatives. Efficiency is legitimate as a single criterion for public policy analysis only when: (1) income distribution and institutional structure (set of working rules) will not change under any policy alternative; or (2) the decisionmaking group elects to ignore any income distribution or institutional effects of a policy selected on the basis of the efficiency criterion. Under these circumstances, it is legitimate for the economist to judge the relative merit of policy A versus policy B based solely on their impacts on the efficiency of the economic system. A change in the land tenure system is a change in the working rules of the society-a basic institutional change. This institutional change will affect the rights and duties of individuals, the liberty and exposure of economic actors, and the income distribution. Under these conditions, efficiency is but one criterion for evaluating public policy options. The efficiency criterion is more appropriate for evaluating marginal changes in the economic system than for basic, nonmarginal changes in the institutions of society. Johnson's exclusive reliance on the efficiency criterion leads him to several errors in his analysis. First, he states that What is important is not so much the pattern of ownership, but whether or not the system of rights and the enforcement of contracts facilitate efficiency in use of land and efficient investments in and on land. I disagree that the pattern and issues of ownership can be neglected. Ownership and tenure will par-