Afghanistan : vingt ans après

Abstract

On August 30, 2021, the last american soldier was leaving Kaboul as the victorious Talibans were back in power, after being driven out twenty years earlier by the armed intervention launched by the USA in response to the 09/11 attacks. Scheduled by the Doha Agreement of February 20, 2020, directly negotiated with theTalibans, the withdrawal of the USA and its allies from Afghanistan came as the price to pay for an accumulation of errors of judgment and faulty assessments from the successive american administrations, who, from the very start, had planned the involvment of the country with that withdrawal in mind instead of clearly singling out their objectives. However, the Taliban’s victory would not have been so devastating had not their victorious march on Kaboul brought about the collapse of the governmental apparatus installed with the UNO decisve help, and cast a remorseless light upon the larger failure of the afghan State reconstruction in spite of a massive jointed effort on an international scale. Dismantled in 2001, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has now been restored under the institutional form of a de facto government which no State has to this day recognized, and finds totally incapable of coping with the attacks of terrorists groups now competing with Al Qaïda, and dealing with the disastrous economic crisis heating the country. The latter demands massive international relief and UNO lasting presence, with the appalling regression of human rights, more particularly as regards the situation of women, young girls and minorities, also put to the forefront. (* ) Professeur émérite de l’Université Paris Panthéon-Assas, co-directeur de l’ AFDI .