Afghanistan: Unconditional Support but Selective Engagement?

Abstract

On December 5, 2011, international representatives returned to the Petersberg near Bonn to negotiate the terms of a continued commitment to Afghanistan. Ten years earlier, politicians, diplomats, and military leaders had convened in the same place to find a common ground for governance in Afghanistan after the ousting of the Taliban.1 As a result of the initial Petersberg conference, the UN Security Council had authorized the establishment of an “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF), under the command of the United Kingdom as the first ISAF “lead nation” and with the participation of 18 other countries, to guarantee the “maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas” (UN-SC, 2001e). While the majority of contributors to ISAF were NATO member states, the operation was initially an ad hoc coalition, since NATO assumed authority for ISAF only two years into the conflict, on August 11, 2003, following a request from Germany and the Netherlands, which had jointly led ISAF from February 2003 onward.2 Likewise, ISAF’s mandate was not expanded to include the entire country of Afghanistan until October 13, 2003, two months after NATO assumed control (UN-SC, 2003f).