Abstract
AbstractThough much of what we learn about the world comes from trusting testimony, the status of aesthetic testimony – testimony about aesthetic value – is equivocal. We do listen to art critics but our trust in them is typically only provisional, until we are in a position to make up our own mind. I argue that provisional trust (but not full trust) in testimony typically allows us to develop and use aesthetic understanding (understanding why a work of art is valuable, or similar); and aesthetic understanding is an essential component of aesthetic virtue. Aesthetic virtue is the orientation of a whole person towards aesthetic value and aesthetic reasons, through action, non‐cognitive and cognitive attitudes. The ideal (aesthetically virtuous) way to make aesthetic judgements is through your own aesthetic understanding.
Highlights
Though1 we learn a great deal about the world from testimony, some kinds, including testimony about aesthetic value and aesthetic reasons (“aesthetic testimony”) seem problematic.2 There is something very peculiar about judging Rembrandt’s drawings great works of art if you haven’t seen them for yourself; or telling people that War and Peace is a masterpiece when you haven’t read a single word.Aesthetic testimony is not the only kind whose status is puzzling
I argue that aesthetic understanding is the cognitive component of aesthetic virtue, and the ideal way to make aesthetic judgements is through your own aesthetic understanding, rather than trusting testimony
The basic problem is that whilst it tells us what is missing in judgements based on aesthetic testimony, it is not obviously true that acquaintance is always required for aesthetic judgement, or why it is, when it is
Summary
Though we learn a great deal about the world from testimony, some kinds, including testimony about aesthetic value and aesthetic reasons (“aesthetic testimony”) seem problematic. There is something very peculiar about judging Rembrandt’s drawings great works of art if you haven’t seen them for yourself; or telling people that War and Peace is a masterpiece when you haven’t read a single word. I argue that we listen to testimony as a guide to developing our own aesthetic understanding, which is an essential component of aesthetic virtue in both creative artists and appreciative audiences. Ideal aesthetic judgements are made on the basis of aesthetic understanding, not testimony. This explanation would generalize satisfactorily to explain the status of moral testimony, since (as I have argued elsewhere) it is plausible that moral understanding is an essential component of moral virtue, and that moral judgements should be made on the basis of that understanding.. I argue that aesthetic understanding is the cognitive component of aesthetic virtue, and the ideal (aesthetically virtuous) way to make aesthetic judgements is through your own aesthetic understanding, rather than trusting testimony. I conclude by suggesting other places where aesthetic understanding and aesthetic virtue may be important, and by drawing parallels between aesthetics and ethics
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