Abstract

ABSTRACTTaste, as a faculty of aesthetic appreciation, involves an individual, and yet assumes a community. In this article, a distinctly singular mode of being attuned to objects of taste is shown to be conditioned by the consent of others and by being-with others, thereby constituting what is named here an ‘aesthetic community.’ This idea of an aesthetic community is traced back to Kant's sensus communis and to Heidegger's notion of preservation: for both, it is the presence of a community that conditions aesthetic experience.

Highlights

  • Taste, as a faculty of aesthetic appreciation, involves an individual, and yet assumes a community

  • The case of Tirana appears to exemplify this Kantian idea of taste as acquired inviting us to examine the relation of taste to the demand of a universal assent

  • How does the appearance of taste as a relevant faculty already assume a demand of agreement? What is it about taste, a faculty of individual cognition, that involves others, that regulates the taste of others and their attunement to objects of taste2? The painting of buildings’ facades in Tirana indicates that when recognizing a representation as an object of taste, this recognition functions as a call, an address made to others, to participate in an aesthetic experience, to likewise become attuned to sensible objects

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Summary

Which community?

The notion of community can mean many things and serve many purposes (Bell, 2020). It can relate to the positioning of the individual within a social link based on contingent attachments or on one’s sense of identity, it can serve diverse political interests (to advance solidarity, equality, or rights), and it can be used to disregard conflicts or to exhibit them. An aesthetic object is addressed to anyone ready to engage in an experience of taste, and anyone who consents to participate (who acquires taste, in Kant’s terms) does not hold prior knowledge regarding the appropriate appreciation of the object This qualification of taste as dissociated from prior knowledge, reveals that the terms of participating in an aesthetic community differ from those of a political one; the latter assumes a shared understanding of a given situation, of its anticipated outcomes, and of definite concepts or aims that guide the community (hoped-for values, ideologies, etc.), as part of the affirmation of others. Unlike Rousseau’s idea of the social bond, singular individuals participate in the community of art without (yet) having a common interest. These elements will be further developed in what follows as the marks of an aesthetic community

A community of singularities
Being-in-common with an aesthetic object
Conclusion
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