Abstract
The recent mortgage crisis was astonishing in its magnitude, both for the mortgage market and the economy as a whole. This chapter begins by discussing who forecast the steep decline in US house prices and the concomitant implosion of the mortgage market, who did not foresee the decline and why, and some of the mechanisms through which the crisis was magnified.It then gives a brief overview of the findings of majority and minority reports of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Among other things, it discusses failures in the underwriting modeling process, the supply chain process, the compensation process, and the rating agencies when it came to fueling the crisis. It also discusses how the inability of participants in the synthetic security markets magnified the crisis.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
