Abstract
This article presents statistical evidence which supports Lester Telser's 1960 hypothesis, that when vertical restraints are made illegal, intrabrand competition results which diminishes the provision of point-of-sale, special services. This results because of the public goods problem exhibited by the special services. Increased special service provision by the national manufacturer must then substitute for the special service provision left unfilled by the wholesaler. Evidence relating to the efficacy of such substitution is also presented.
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