Abstract
Sellers selected both price and quality but buyers had limited information about those choices in the experiments reported here. Market efficiency was high under full information with truthful advertising of prices and qualities, but was much lower with no advertising of price or quality. Efficiency did not improve when sellers were permitted to advertise price, but not quality, and in half of these experiments “lemons” outcomes occurred. Although the range of outcomes is great, it cannot be claimed that price advertising improves efficiency when quality is unknown.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
