Adverse political incentives and obstinate behavioural norms: a study of social safety nets in Bangladesh

Abstract

Despite the relative success of poverty alleviation over the last two decades, the issue of social safety nets remains an intriguing issue in the area of the strategic intervention of the government of Bangladesh. This article aims at exploring two sets of challenges: adverse political incentives and obstinate behavioural norms. In doing so, the current article proposes a conceptual framework that highlights the effects of clientelism, institutional frameworks and their enforcements, and social, human and technological factors on social safety nets. Further, it also shows how social safety nets influence the reduction of poverty, vulnerabilities and risks, leading towards the capacity building and empowerment of vulnerable people. The case of Bangladesh is discussed in the light of the proposed conceptual framework. Points for practitioners State decision-makers and implementers may take cognizance of the importance of the participation of pro-poor civic forums at different stages of social safety net intervention, the allocation of adequate resources, and addressing numerous management deficits confronting social safety nets. International development organizations also need to consider the contextual variables while providing assistance to developing countries in general and Bangladesh in particular. Political actors and administrators also need to take into account major contradictions in the formulation and implementation of social safety net programmes in Bangladesh.